

10208

Approved For Release 2005/05/12 : CIA-RDP67B00446R000500120027-5 May 14, 1965

that that advance will be met with some signal or sign from the other side.

I ask unanimous consent that an editorial which appeared in this morning's New York Times entitled "To H.C.M. from L.B.J." be printed in the Record at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From the New York Times, May 14, 1965]

To H.C.M. From L.B.J.

President Johnson's speech on Vietnam yesterday could not have been more clearly addressed to Hanoi if it had been marked "attention Ho Chi Minh." It was an effort worth making even if it remains unanswered at present. For the mere attempt to talk intelligently at, if unfortunately not to, the adversary forces the formulation of ideas in a new and useful way.

In an administration that has generally emphasized the military approach, it is important that the President is now stressing—as many critics of administration policies have long insisted—that "there is no purely military solution in sight for either side." In his remarks yesterday, there was no unrealistic talk of "victory" or "winning the war" as there often has been in the words of his advisers.

The purpose to which he intends devoting "unlimited resources," Mr. Johnson indicates, is that of denying victory to the other side while seeking a negotiated settlement. This is a policy that is welcome and needs even more explicit clarification at a time when—after doubts that any such decision had been made—additional American troops in large numbers are being sent to South Vietnam. At 44,000, the number of American troops there now is well over three times the pre-Johnson level.

The President's speech drew a useful distinction between Hanoi and the Vietnamese government, which seek the fulfillment of Vietnamese nationalism, and Communist China, which seeks "domination over all of Asia" including, as he said, Vietnam. And in a tone new to Washington, Mr. Johnson observed that many of the "individual fighting men" we must now, sadly, call the enemy, "are trying 'to shatter the old ways which have imprisoned hope' and to reach for 'the material fruits from the tree of modern knowledge.'" He urged Hanoi to pursue its own interests by coming to the conference table, freeing itself from the control of a China that wants to continue the war irrespective of the cost of China's allies.

It is in this context that the President has now indicated for the first time that once peace is restored, all forms of American aid—not just the fruits of a projected Mekong Valley development that might not touch North Vietnam directly—will be available to all the people of Vietnam, "north and south alike." The wise decision to help found an Asian Development Bank with, it is hoped, the backing of all industrialized nations including the Soviet Union, has evidently been taken on the recommendation of Eugene Black. It should open the way for the kinds of soft loans and long-term multilateral development aid needed in Asia's special circumstances, with which present American and United Nations machinery is unable to cope.

The President wields the country's vast influence most effectively when he voices, as he did yesterday, its desire to explore "every possible path" to peace. If he will but continue now to pursue honorable negotiations with the vigor and persistence he has applied to military measures, he will be on the road that is most likely to lead to the honorable settlement he and the American people clearly want.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I note in particular the comment in the editorial that the President has now indicated for the first time that once peace is restored, all forms of American aid—not merely the fruits of a projected Mekong Valley development that might not touch North Vietnam directly—will be available to all the people of Vietnam, north and south alike.

Mr. President, the enormous sums of money which we have spent during the past number of years to ameliorate the conditions of the people of South Vietnam should be taken note of by not only Americans, but by everyone interested in the southeast Asian dilemma. That great amount of money appears to have been to a substantial extent wasted, because of the condition of warfare in that country. Yet we do know, as the President has told us, that there are more schools, better health measures, better transportation arrangements, and a better rice crop. We also realize that conditions in Vietnam should come to the point where we would know that a people could live in peace and look forward to some prosperity.

I commend the President for his humanitarian and idealistic views as to the future of that part of the world. I hope and pray that he will be able to get us into negotiations for a settlement of the carnage, the death, the torture, and the warfare in that country within the very near future.

THE SITUATION IN THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, first I should like to offer for the Record a recent editorial published in the New York Times entitled "Government by Crisis." I ask that it be printed in the Record at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

GOVERNMENT BY CRISIS

The Dominican and Vietnam troubles disclose a serious weakness in this country's management of its foreign affairs. This weakness has been a long time developing and it will not easily be set right, but its many-sided nature and its implications deserve exploration.

The weakness is simply stated. Congress control of the warmaking power has been eroded almost to the point of invisibility. This development is readily understandable insofar as the waging of thermonuclear war is concerned. If the President learns that hostile atomic missiles have been launched against the United States, he has no time and no choice except to act in his unique capacity as Commander in Chief.

But it is guerrilla wars, undeclared wars, civil wars, and wars by subversion that now plague the world and are likely to continue as the chief difficulties in the years ahead. It is in this area of policymaking that the people's elected representatives in Congress have largely abdicated their constitutional responsibilities.

Speed is not the overriding consideration in making policy in these diverse difficulties. The war in Vietnam, for example, has been dragging on for several years and U.S. activity there has been intensifying for 6 months. Yet Congress has not conducted a

full, serious debate on American participation.

It is true, of course, that Congress has gone on record not once but twice. President Johnson has seen to that. Last August, after a now almost forgotten retaliatory air strike in the Gulf of Tonkin, and again last week, Congress dutifully countersigned what came close to being a blank check. In the case of the August resolution and of last week's \$700 million appropriation bill, there was a suddenly announced television speech by the President. Then came the submission of a hastily drafted proposal which the relevant committees of Congress approved with the flimsiest of hearings and which both Houses approved with no real deliberation.

From initiation to Presidential signature, each of these maneuvers took only 3 days. That is not constitutional procedure; it is a caricature of such procedure.

The Dominican trouble exemplifies congressional default in a different form. In October 1963, after a military junta overthrew President Juan Bosch in the Dominican Republic, Senators Jacob Javits of New York and Warren Moss of Oregon, introduced a resolution intended to set forth the sense of Congress on Latin-American dictatorships.

No action was ever taken on this resolution. Nor did the relevant House and Senate committees develop any congressional judgment on American policy in the event of future revolutions and coups in Latin America. When civil war erupted in the Dominican Republic, President Johnson acted in a vacuum, one partly of Congress' own making.

The problem long predates Mr. Johnson's Presidency. It first became evident in the failure of Congress to clarify its own responsibility for the waging of war in Korea, where war was never actually declared.

There are many present contributing influences to the diminution of congressional authority in policymaking, quite apart from Mr. Johnson's forceful assertion of leadership. One is Senator Dumas's extension of responsible bipartisanship into something that often approaches coalition government. Another is the reluctance of Senator Fulbright to follow his independent ideas by asserting his full authority as chairman of the Foreign Relations Committee.

But beyond these transient personal factors, there has been an institutional failure on the part of Congress to develop the new procedures and tradition necessary to protect its role in the making of foreign policy in a new age of international political warfare.

The nature of the cold war, the speed with which minor engagements can escalate, the extent to which secret information must help shape vital decisions—all these and many other factors have made the development of new procedures and practices difficult. But they have also made them essential if there is not to be a total erosion of Congress' authority in this field and an atrophy of democratic debate.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the editorial points out that both the Dominican and the Vietnamese troubles disclose a serious weakness in this country's management of its foreign affairs.

The editorial points out:

The weakness is simply stated. Congress control of the warmaking power has been eroded almost to the point of invisibility.

The editorial continues:

There has been an institutional failure on the part of Congress to develop the new procedures and tradition necessary to protect its role in the making of foreign policy in a new age of international political warfare.

May 14, 1965

I am in complete accord with that statement in the editorial. I do not believe we have done our job in Congress. I believe we should resume an active interest in terms of our historic power of advice and consent in determining the course of our foreign policy. The day-to-day conduct of foreign policy is, of course, in the hands of the President of the United States. I support him in his efforts to restore and maintain peace. However, Congress has an obligation which I believe we have been slow and perhaps loath to fulfill.

I hope that we will be more active in fulfilling that constitutional responsibility.

Another excellent editorial recently appeared in the New York Times. It is entitled "The Dominican Morass." I ask unanimous consent that it may be printed at this point in my remarks.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

THE DOMINICAN MORASS

The United States is getting more and more deeply involved inside the Dominican Republic, politically as well as militarily. What began as an uprising has become a civil war in a state of suspended animation. Whether there was or was not a genuine threat of a Communist coup—and U.S. correspondents are emphatic in casting doubt on Washington's assertions that there was—it is clear that Dominican and Latin American communism has been strengthened in reaction against the American intervention.

What may have seemed to the American public to be a simple operation when President Johnson first sent in marines on April 28 has become a complicated, confused, and potentially explosive act of forced majeure, with profound effects on the whole Inter-American system. Some of the United States best friends in Latin America are included among the anti-Communist governments and peoples whom American intervention has alienated. The man in whose name the rebellion was started, the strongly anti-Communist Juan Bosch, may yet prove correct in his bitter comment that the United States, by its intervention, will create far more Communist sympathizers in the Dominican Republic and Latin America than were on hand—whatever their number—when the revolt began.

The Dominican situation is proving that the best intentions mean little or nothing in the face of contrary realities. No one could doubt the sincerity of Under Secretary Mann when he stated in an interview with the Times that the United States does not want to dictate the kind of government the Dominicans choose. But the fact is that the U.S. intervention bolstered a rightwing military group against a movement that, while it had some Communists within it, was for the most part democratic in spirit and intention. The idea of supporting the Bosch elements against the Communist minority in the rebel ranks was apparently never even entertained.

When it became clear that the military junta's first leader, Gen. Wessin y Wessin, was adamantly opposed in the Dominican Republic and throughout Latin America, Washington came up with another—but equally unpopular and rightwing—protege. American correspondents on the spot agree that General Imbert, now head of the junta, was chosen, groomed, and put in by the Americans and is being kept in power by Americans.

U.S. representatives refused even to talk with the rebel group headed by Lieutenant

Colonel Caamaño until yesterday although Colonel Caamaño clearly has a considerable following throughout the Dominican Republic. In his enclave in Santo Domingo, surrounded by American troops, he has thousands of fanatically dedicated and well-armed followers.

In present circumstances the stalemate can be broken in only two ways. One is a cleanup by the American troops of the rebel enclave in Santo Domingo, with inevitable slaughter and destruction. The other is continued negotiation with the Caamaño-Bosch group. Of the two methods, it is a peaceful settlement that holds the best hope—we believe the only hope—of controlling ultimately the Dominican Communists.

In the long run, even if the marines once again stay on for years, it is the Dominicans and not the Americans who are going to decide the fate of the Dominican Republic.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, the editorial points out—and I share the view—that there is very grave question as to whether or not there is now or ever was a genuine threat of a Communist coup in the Dominican Republic. It points out that the U.S. correspondents on the scene are emphatic in casting doubt on Washington's assertions that there were. It is clear, as the editorial points out, that "Dominican and Latin-American communism has been strengthened in the reaction against the American intervention." It has certainly not been weakened.

In my opinion, for every Communist in the Dominican Republic that we rout out or kill or capture or scare back to Cuba, we make 100 and perhaps 1,000 other Communists by the ruthless methods of our intervention in the Dominican Republic, in violation of our treaty commitments.

In this connection I should like to make a few comments. In my opinion, the greatest contribution that we in the Senate can make to the day-to-day course of events in the Dominican Republic is to urge that the United States maintain a strictly neutral posture between the so-called rebel government, which is actually the only government with a surety of constitutional authority behind it, in the Dominican Republic, and the various military generals and juntas with whom, in my opinion, our Armed Forces have become entirely too friendly.

Note should be taken of the fact that it was a high ranking naval officer and not a representative of the State Department who first made the announcement on the scene in the Dominican Republic that our purpose in sending the marines, and later Army troops, into the Dominican Republic was not only to protect American lives—and let it be noted parenthetically that not one single American civilian has received as much as one scratch either before or after our troops went in—but also, as this high ranking anonymous naval officer was quoted as saying, to prevent a Communist government from taking over in the Dominican Republic.

I am concerned that day-to-day military operations are overtaking diplomacy in the Dominican Republic. I am concerned that our Ambassador has appar-

ently been panicked into believing that we were faced with an overriding emergency under which a takeover by a Communist government in the Dominican Republic was imminent. I am distressed that he felt that he should rely to the extent that he did on the "Dominican Joe McCarthy," General Wessin y Wessin, and the assassinator of Trujillo, the former civilian Imbert, who, in reward for his assassination, was made a general.

One difficulty with the situation in the Dominican Republic is that as a result of 30 years of tyranny, torture, death, and assassination, most of the brains and most of the ability in the civilian population in the Dominican Republic has been murdered or chased out of the island by Trujillo and his minions. It would be a great tragedy if we were to aid and abet the military junta in resuming power in that country.

I am happy indeed that the President was so quick to call in the Organization of American States. I note with pleasure that he has taken as his advisers a select group of very able Latin Americans who are friendly to our country—individuals such as former President Betancourt of Venezuela, former President Jose Figueres of Costa Rica, and other high officials who happen to be American citizens, such as former Assistant Secretary of State Morales, who is now working with the OAC, and that magnificent colonial administrator, former Governor Muñoz-Marin of Puerto Rico. I hope that advice of those people will be listened to with great interest and followed in the White House, and I have every hope that it will.

I should like to make another suggestion in connection with the situation in the Dominican Republic. The sooner we can get our troops out of there, the better. The sooner we can turn the military situation over to contingents from the other countries which are members of the Organization of American States, the sooner we shall prove to the people of Latin America, whose friendship and respect we so desperately want, that our action is not a return to gunboat diplomacy, and that our intervention was merely to protect lives and to prevent chaos.

I wonder what justification we can give for housing as many as 22,000 troops in the Dominican Republic in the environs of Santo Domingo? It should also be noted for the Record that there has been no uprising of any sort in that country. Outside Santo Domingo everything is quiet. So I would hope that we would be able in short order to bring back the majority, if not all, of our troops in order to reestablish our belief in the rule of law, our belief in collective action, and our repudiation of that gunboat diplomacy—that dollar diplomacy—which got us into so much trouble with our neighbors in the early days of the present century.

I should like to make one final suggestion in that regard. The unrest in the Dominican Republic is not entirely political. A great deal of it is economic. In a country with perhaps no more than 3 million people there are at least 500,000

May 14, 1965

who are totally unemployed. Perhaps the most effective gesture we could make to restore and pacify the country, to take people's minds off of political issues, and place them in a situation where they would be thankful for American intervention instead of antagonistic would be to organize a program of needed public works which could give employment to vast numbers of the unemployed in the Dominican Republic.

I believe we ought to look pretty carefully in the Senate—certainly in the executive arm—to the charge which has been widely repeated that the real force behind the counterrevolution which threw out the constitutionally elected President Juan Bosch, and which is now attempting to crush the rebellion headed by his deputy Caamano, are economic interests, American and Dominican alike, and particularly sugar interests, which are concerned lest a liberal government come into office with power to enforce a badly and long needed land reform, to see that adequate taxes are collected from the very rich who are making money out of agriculture and industrial operations in the Dominican Republic, and to assure that in due course we can have a Government which is not controlled by a military junta, but by a Government which has substantial support from the civilian population in the Government.

Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent to have printed at this point in the RECORD an editorial entitled "Our Dominican Objective," published in the Washington Evening Star, issue of May 4.

There being no objection, the editorial was ordered to be printed in the RECORD, as follows:

OUR DOMINICAN OBJECTIVE

Among a mass of falsehoods, there was one grain of truth or near truth, in Nikolai Fedorenko's remarks to the Security Council. The United States, the Russian representative declared, is determined to use its Armed Forces to suppress Communist-supported national liberation movements not only in Latin America, but in Asia and other parts of the world as well.

Had he said Communist dominated, this would have been substantially true. Certainly we are fully committed to use our Armed Forces to prevent the forceful emergence of another Communist regime in this hemisphere. And in certain situations in Asia, where we have treaty or other commitments, as in Vietnam, we also will use our Armed Forces to cope with these so-called wars of national liberation.

The true nature of these wars should be understood. No one, except in the last extremity, intends to fight an all-out nuclear war. The cost would be prohibitive. It also seems doubtful that there will be another large-scale conventional war. There's too much danger that it might escalate into a nuclear war. Hence, the war of liberation. The Communists can foment this kind of war at small cost and little risk to themselves. And where an indigenous revolutionary movement, as in Vietnam, can be encouraged and eventually taken over, a war of liberation can be a very difficult thing to deal with. But Mr. Fedorenko is right in saying that the United States will resist them to the best of its ability. If we don't, who will?

The principal effort in the Dominican Republic at this time, however, is on the attempt to find a formula for peace, not on war. Our troops are not fighting the rebels

in any meaningful sense. Instead, they are "containing" them while the OAS commission presses its search for acceptable terms.

Obviously, this search may be quite difficult. One must hope, however, that it will succeed. The President has repeated that we will pull out our forces as soon as a peace plan is developed which offers some hope of stability of government. The inference, of course, is that the troops will stay where they are until some such peace plan emerges. Hence, the sooner an agreement is reached the better it will be for all concerned.

THE OUTRAGE IN MEXICO

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President—

The ACTING PRESIDENT pro tempore. The Senator from Louisiana is recognized.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. Mr. President, with the crisis which arose in the Dominican Republic, it may very well be that many of my colleagues and other American citizens may have overlooked the recent action taken by another Latin American neighbor, Mexico, respecting American sulfur interests. Under what appears to be the pretext of protecting its natural resources in the form of sulfur reserves, the Mexican Government has announced that it will limit exports under a formula which very well may prevent the two American companies operating in Mexico—Gulf Sulphur Corp. and Pan American Sulphur Co.—from exporting sulfur produced there. This action on the part of the Mexican Government is tantamount to expropriation since Mexico is unable to consume sulfur in quantities nearly sufficient to make it financially feasible for Pan American and Gulf Sulphur to continue their mining operations.

This being the case, the only alternative would be for these American-owned companies to make some arrangement to sell or otherwise dispose of their investment in Mexico. Since American investors certainly would not risk putting dollars into an industry which has been deprived of its basic markets, the only alternative would seem to be a forced sale to the Mexican Government or to local nationals selected by Mexico. Although the Mexican Government probably will argue that they have not taken over the sulfur industry, the fact remains that what they are doing will have that result, the only difference being that it will be shrouded in a veil of respectability under the name of conservation. Instead of directly taking over the American sulfur interests, Mexico is simply forcing them out of business.

As has been advocated in the Senate before, it is high time that the American Government take some steps toward preventing the loss of American dollars abroad through expropriation, especially in the case of those countries to whom we give great sums in economic aid. Mexico is one of those countries. Why should we, as a country, support the economic program of a nation which in turn imposes economic sanctions against our citizens? In the case of the American sulfur industry in Mexico, we are not talking about so-called robber barons who have exploited for huge profits

the resources and people of an underprivileged or economically depressed nation. If this were the situation there might be some merit, or at least an excuse, for forcing out American industry. However, let us look at the facts with respect to one of the companies which may stand to lose its entire investment in Mexico. Gulf Sulphur Corp. is a relatively small company which completed construction of mine facilities early in 1956 at a cost of \$10 million and began operations in May of that year. The company employs 500 people, only 17 of whom are U.S. citizens. Most of these employees work in Salinas, which is a town of 3,500 people, located in the semi-tropical State of Vera Cruz. Before the sulfur company came to Salinas, the people depended upon river water in its unpurified state for drinking and cooking, but they are now receiving potable water from the mining operations. The nearest hospital was an hour and a half away by boat, but the mining company now maintains a well-equipped hospital with two doctors and four nurses who treat the villagers. The company gave to the union to which its employees belong a school that the town theretofore had been unable to afford. Four years ago only 45 pupils were enrolled in the school's 6 grades, while today there are 375 attending a modern 10-classroom school, well staffed with qualified teachers. In addition, its students who wish to continue their education through high school at a distant town are provided transportation expenses and through a full scholarship program some students will go on to one of Mexico's colleges or universities. Gulf Sulphur Corp. also has a project underway for building 118 houses and a large community building in Salinas, which will cost approximately \$260,000. This project, of course, will have to be abandoned in the event that it must give up its operations due to the action of the Mexican Government.

What I have outlined here clearly shows that this company, rather than trying to exploit the citizens of Mexico, has given to them benefits far and above those which could be provided by their own government. This is not a case of an American company reaping the riches of a depressed country by using low labor costs to extract its natural resources solely for the personal gain of its investors. Since 1956, expenditures by Gulf Sulphur Corp. in Mexico, in the form of royalties, taxes, salaries, wages, profitsharing, medical, and social benefits to employees, and other expenses have totaled approximately 600 million pesos. Currently 80 percent of each peso generated from sulfur sales is being left in Mexico. The balance, or 20 percent of each peso, has been used to pay freight on sulfur shipments from Mexico, construct liquid sulfur terminals in the United States, service debt created in the United States, and for general and administrative costs. To date, the stockholders of the company have not been paid dividends.

The tragedy of this irresponsible action of the Mexican Government, therefore, lies not only with the loss of investment by American citizens, but also by the loss